Đầu tiên, phá giá xảy ra trong bối cảnh của sự cân bằng của cuộc khủng hoảng các khoản thanh toán có liên quan đến thiệt hại của sự tự tin và tăng sự không chắc chắn gây tổn hại cho hoạt động kinh tế. Đó thường là trường hợp đó, | Table Country rankings of vulnerability to banking crises for two periodsa January 1996-June 1997 January 1996-December 1997 Country Rank Experienced crisisb Country Rank Experienced crisisb Most vulnerable Czech Republic 1 Czech Republic 1 South Korea 2 South Korea 2 Greece 3 Thailand 3 South Africa 4 South Africa 4 Thailand 5 Colombia 5 Least vulnerable Venezuela 15 Chile 16 Chile 16 Argentina 17 Peru 17 Venezuela 18 Uruguay 18 Peru 19 Mexico 19 Uruguay 20 a. Weighted index is a sum of the weighted signals flashing at any time during the specified period. Monthly and annual indicators are included. Weights are equal to the inverse noise-to-signal ratios of the respective indicators. b. An asterisk indicates that the country experienced a crisis during the out-of-sample period. Turning to banking crises the ordinal rankings of country vulnerability again are quite similar across the two out-of-sample periods although the correspondence is slightly lower than was the case for currency crises four of the five countries estimated to be most vulnerable to banking crises are the same across the two periods. Specifically for the 1996 to mid-1997 period the five most vulnerable countries again in descending order were Czech Republic South Korea Greece South Africa and Thailand table . When the out-of-sample period is extended through the end of 1997 Greece drops out of the top five and is replaced by Colombia. As with the vulnerability rankings for currency crises it is useful to ask which of the countries estimated to be most vulnerable to banking crises actually suffered that fate during the out-of-sample periods. As suggested earlier this is intrinsically a tougher question to answer for banking crises than for currency crises because the identification and dating of crises are subject to wider margins of error. Recall also that because our 24-month early warning window for banking crises covers both the 12-month period preceding the beginning of the crisis as
