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SUPPLY CHAIN GAMES: OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT AND RISK VALUATION phần 10

tổng hợp các chứng ngộ nhu cầu tiềm năng về một đơn đặt hàng và danh mục đầu tư hợp đồng sản phẩm phái sinh là bản sao (có nghĩa là có thể đáp ứng) nhu cầu ở tất cả các giá cả và trong tất cả các tình huống. Hàm ý của cách tiếp cận của chúng tôi | 460 8 QUALITY AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT T C p Ci 1 -p where u11 r - f-i C p - f1 p 1 p I c . k p k p L As a result if there is an interior solution we have pC p - C p Ô ci I 1 2 I . k 1 - p Note that this requires as well that C p C p p For example if C p A 1 - p then c f 2p-1 I with p 1. A k 1 p l- p 3 2 Alternatively under the second equilibrium we have Max u21 Max r -I1 p 1 p I C p - c I 1 p T 1 - p 0 p 1 0 p 1 k p p s.t. T C p c 1 - p . Let p p be the optimal solutions under both equilibria then obviously the supplier will adopt the solution leading to the largest expected payoff of the game. By changing the assumptions regarding the relative power each of the parties has we will obtain of course other solutions. These are discussed below. Each of the solutions considered here can be altered by an appropriate selection of contract parameters which can lead to a pre-posterior game analysis evaluated in terms of p T see also Reyniers and Tapiero 1995a for the analysis of contracts . If the supplier and the producer do not cooperate and thus the Nash equilibrium solutions defined here are appropriate it is possible to create an incentive for the supplier to supply quality parts by the selection of contract parameters. A sensitivity analysis of some of these solutions follows. For convenience we consider only the case with interior solutions and study the effects of T on the propensity to sample. Obviously the larger T the less the manufacturer-customer will sample since y 0 . Further -----c------r 0. 1 - p h T 2 8.3 YIELD AND CONTROL 461 Similar relationships can be found by treating other parameters. The implications are that increases in T provide an incentive for the supplier to sample while for the customer to sample less. Stackelberg equilibrium When either the customer or the supplier is a leader and the other a follower we define a Stackelberg game Stackelberg 1952 . For example say that the supplier is a leader and the customer is a follower. Then for a