Tuyển tập báo cáo các nghiên cứu khoa học quốc tế ngành hóa học dành cho các bạn yêu hóa học tham khảo đề tài: Research Article The Waterfilling Game-Theoretical Framework for Distributed Wireless Network Information Flow | Hindawi Publishing Corporation EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking Volume 2010 Article ID 482975 13 pages doi 2010 482975 Research Article The Waterfilling Game-Theoretical Framework for Distributed Wireless Network Information Flow Gaoning He 1 Laura Cottatellucci 2 and Merouane Debbah3 1 Research Innovation Center Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell 388 Ningqiao Road Pudong Shanghai 201206 China 2 Department of Mobile Communications EURECOM 06904 Sophia-Antipolis Cedex France 3Alcatel-Lucent Chair on Flexible Radio 3 Rue Joliot-Curie 91192 Gifsur Yvette France Correspondence should be addressed to Gaoning He Received 1 October 2009 Revised 13 May 2010 Accepted 2 July 2010 Academic Editor Zhi Tian Copyright 2010 Gaoning He et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited. We present a general game-theoretical framework for power allocation in the downlink of distributed wireless small-cell networks where multiple access points APs or small base stations send independent coded network information to multiple mobile terminals MTs through orthogonal channels. In such a game-theoretical study a central question is whether a Nash equilibrium NE exists and if so whether the network operates efficiently at the NE. For independent continuous fading channels we prove that the probability of a unique NE existing in the game is equal to 1. Furthermore we show that this power allocation problem can be studied as a potential game and hence efficiently solved. In order to reach the NE we propose a distributed waterfilling-based algorithm requiring very limited feedback. The convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm is discussed. Finally numerical results are provided to investigate the price of anarchy or inefficiency of the NE. 1. Introduction Recently there has .
