Tuyển tập báo cáo các nghiên cứu khoa học quốc tế ngành hóa học dành cho các bạn yêu hóa học tham khảo đề tài: Research Article Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach | Hindawi Publishing Corporation EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing Volume 2009 Article ID 927140 12 pages doi 2009 927140 Research Article Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity A Dynamic Game Approach Sintayehu Dehnie1 and Nasir Memon2 1 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Polytechnic Institute of New York University 5 MetroTech Brooklyn NY 11201 USA 2 Department of Computer and Information Science Polytechnic Institute of New York University 5 MetroTech Brooklyn nY 11201 uSa Correspondence should be addressed to Sintayehu Dehnie sintayehu@ Received 1 November 2008 Revised 9 March 2009 Accepted 14 April 2009 Recommended by Zhu Han Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy ESS . Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game
