Tham khảo tài liệu 'learning financial accounting theory_8', tài chính - ngân hàng, kế toán - kiểm toán phục vụ nhu cầu học tập, nghiên cứu và làm việc hiệu quả | An Analysis of Conflict 305 higher an incumbent firms monopoly profits the more incentive it had to engage in manipulative financial reporting. We see then that implications of the D s analysis have a deeper significance. By delineating conditions under which firms may or may not dii conditions under which standard setting may or may not be needed are identified. Since D s other papers have refined and extended the tions. See for example Darrough 1993 Newman and Sar. Feltham and Xie 1994 . sclose voluntarily above considera-ising 1993 and SUMMARY Non-cooperative game theory enables us to model the conflict situation that often exists between different constituencies of financial statement users. Even a very simple game-theoretic model shows that an accounting standard setting body that fails to consider the interests of all constituencies affected by accounting policy choice is in danger of making policy recommendations that are difficult to implement. Furthermore conflict analysis can be used to examine conditions under which standards may or may not be needed since unde some conditions firms may be motivated to release even unfavourable information voluntarily. IlViu t they perceive as e many such con- types of contracts are employment Some Models of Cooperative Game Ệ INTRODUCTION While the non-cooperative game in Example illustrates some of the implications of conflict between user constituencies many other areas of accounting exhibit cooperative behaviour. Recall that the essence of cooperation here is that the players in a game situation can enter into agreements tha binding. Such agreements are often called contracts. There ar tractual agreements that have accounting implications. In this section we will be concerned with two important that have implications for financial accounting theory. These contracts between the firm and its top manager and lending contracts between the firm manager and the bondholder. In these contracts we can think of
