Tham khảo tài liệu 'the free information society bargaining and markets_3', tài chính - ngân hàng, đầu tư chứng khoán phục vụ nhu cầu học tập, nghiên cứu và làm việc hiệu quả | Time Preference 81 The result provides additional support for the Nash solution. In a model like that of the previous section where some small amount of exogenous uncertainty interferes with the bargaining process we have shown that all equilibria that lead to agreement with positive probability are close to the Nash solution of the associated bargaining problem. The result is different than that of the previous section in three respects. First the demand game is static. Second the disagreement point is always an equilibrium outcome of a perturbed demand game the result restricts the character only of equilibria that result in agreement with positive probability. Third the result depends on the differentiability and quasi-concavity of the perturbing function characteristics that do not appear to be natural. Time Preference We now turn back to the bargaining model of alternating offers studied in Chapter 3 in which the players impatience is the driving force. In this section we think of a period in the bargaining game as an interval of real time of length A 0 and examine the limit of the subgame perfect equilibria of the game as A approaches zero. Thus we generalize the discussion in Section which deals only with time preferences with a constant discount rate. We show that the limit of the subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game as the delay between offers approaches zero can be calculated using a simple formula closely related to the one used to characterize the Nash solution. However we do not consider the limit to be the Nash solution since the utility functions that appear in the formula reflect the players time preferences not their attitudes toward risk as in the Nash bargaining solution. Bargaining Games with Short Periods Consider a bargaining game of alternating offers see Definition in which the delay between offers is A offers can be made only at a time in the denumerable set 0 A 2A . . We denote such a game by r A . We
