Tham khảo tài liệu 'the free information society bargaining and markets_6', tài chính - ngân hàng, đầu tư chứng khoán phục vụ nhu cầu học tập, nghiên cứu và làm việc hiệu quả | CHAPTER 8 Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry Introduction In this chapter we study two strategic models of decentralized trade in a market in which all potential traders are present initially cf. Model B of Chapter 6 . In the first model there is a single indivisible good that is traded for a divisible good money a trader leaves the market once he has completed a transaction. In the second model there are many divisible goods agents can make a number of trades before departing from the market. This second model is close to the standard economic model of competitive markets. We focus on the conditions under which the outcome of decentralized trade is competitive we point to the elements of the models that are critical for a competitive outcome to emerge. In the course of the analysis several issues arise concerning the nature of the information possessed by the agents. In Chapter 10 we return to the first model and study in detail the role of the informational assumptions in leading to a competitive outcome. 151 152 Chapter 8. A Market with One-Time Entry A Market in Which There Is a Single Indivisible Good The first model is possibly the simplest model that combines pairwise meetings with strategic bargaining. Goods A single indivisible good is traded for some quantity of a divisible good money . Time Time is discrete and is indexed by the nonnegative integers. Economic Agents In period 0 S identical sellers enter the market with one unit of the indivisible good each and B S identical buyers enter with one unit of money each. No more agents enter at any later date. Each individual s preferences on lotteries over the price p at which a transaction is concluded satisfy the assumptions of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Each seller s preferences are represented by the utility function p and each buyer s preferences are represented by the utility function 1 p . the reservation values of the seller and buyer are zero and one respectively and no
