Tham khảo tài liệu 'the free information society bargaining and markets_7', tài chính - ngân hàng, đầu tư chứng khoán phục vụ nhu cầu học tập, nghiên cứu và làm việc hiệu quả | CHAPTER 9 The Role of the Trading Procedure Introduction In this chapter we focus on the role of the trading procedure in determining the outcome of trade. The models of markets in the previous three chapters have in common the following three features. 1. The bargaining is always bilateral. All negotiations take place between two agents. In particular an agent is not allowed to make offers simultaneously to more than one other agent. 2. The termination of an unsuccessful match is exogenous. No agent has the option of deciding to stop the negotiations. 3. An agreement is restricted to be a price at which the good is exchanged. Other agreements are not allowed a pair of agents cannot agree that one of them will pay the other to leave the market or that they will execute a trade only under certain conditions. The strategic approach has the advantage that it allows us to construct models in which we can explore the role of these three features. 173 174 Chapter 9. The Role of the Trading Procedure As in other parts of the book we aim to exhibit only the main ideas in the field. To do so we study several models in all of which we make the following assumptions. Goods A single indivisible good is traded for some quantity of a divisible good money . Time Time is discrete and is indexed by the nonnegative integers. Economic Agents In period 0 a single seller whom we refer to as S and two buyers whom we refer to as BH and BL enter the market. The seller owns one unit of the indivisible good. The two buyers have reservation values for the good of vH and vL respectively where vH vL 0. No more agents enter the market at any later date cf. Model B in Chapter 6 . All three agents have time preferences with a constant discount factor of 0 Ỗ 1. An agreement on the price p in period t yields a payoff of 5tp for the seller and of Ji v p for a buyer with reservation value v. If an agent does not trade then his payoff is zero. When uncertainty is involved we assume that the agents
