Chapter 15 provides knowledge of corporate governance. This chapter presents the following content: Six potential problems with managerial behavior, corporate governance, corporate governance provisions under a firm’s control, effective boards of directors,. | CHAPTER 15 Corporate Governance Six Potential Problems with Managerial Behavior Expend too little time and effort. Consume too many nonpecuniary benefits. Avoid difficult decisions (., close plant) out of loyalty to friends in company. (More . .) Six Problems with Managerial Behavior (Continued) Reject risky positive NPV projects to avoid looking bad if project fails; take on risky negative NPV projects to try and hit a home run. Avoid returning capital to investors by making excess investments in marketable securities or by paying too much for acquisitions. Massage information releases or manage earnings to avoid revealing bad news. Corporate Governance The set of laws, rules, and procedures that influence a company’s operations and the decisions made by its managers. Sticks (threat of removal) Carrots (compensation) Corporate Governance Provisions Under a Firm’s Control Board of directors Charter provisions affecting takeovers Compensation plans Capital structure choices Internal accounting control systems Effective Boards of Directors Election mechanisms make it easier for minority shareholders to gain seats: Not a “classified” board (., all board members elected each year, not just those with multi-year staggered terms) Board elections allow cumulative voting (More . .) Effective Boards of Directors CEO is not chairman of the board and does not have undue influence over the nominating committee. Board has a majority of outside directors (., those who do not have another position in the company) with business expertise. (More . .) Effective Boards of Directors (Continued) Is not an interlocking board (CEO of company A sits on board of company B, CEO of B sits on board of A). Board members are not unduly busy (., set on too many other boards or have too many other business activities) (More . .) Effective Boards of Directors (Continued) Compensation for board directors is appropriate Not so high that it encourages cronyism with CEO Not all compensation is fixed salary (., some compensation is linked to firm performance or stock performance) Anti-Takeover Provisions Targeted share repurchases (., greenmail) Shareholder rights provisions (., poison pills) Restricted voting rights plans Stock Options in Compensation Plans Gives owner of option the right to buy a share of the company’s stock at a specified price (called the strike price or exercise price) even if the actual stock price is higher. Usually can’t exercise the option for several years (called the vesting period). Stock Options (Cont.) Can’t exercise the option after a certain number of years (called the expiration, or maturity, date). Problems with Stock Options Manager can underperform market or peer group, yet still reap rewards from options as long as the stock price increases to above the exercise cost. Options sometimes encourage managers to falsify financial statements or take excessive risks. Block Ownership Outside investor owns large amount (., block) of company’s shares Institutional investors, such as CalPERS or TIAA-CREF Blockholders often monitor managers and take active role, leading to better corporate governance Regulatory Systems and Laws Companies in countries with strong protection for investors tend to have: Better access to financial markets A lower cost of equity Increased market liquidity Less noise in stock prices Regulatory Systems and Laws Institutional Owners Calpers Gadfly
