The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 38. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 350 Goodman Nelson sensory items rather than physical things. He describes himself as a nominalist and The Structure of Appearance as formulated in nominalistic terms. Goodman s nominal-ism is sometimes described as a rejection of classes but may best be summed up in his words the nominalist recognizes no distinction of entities without a distinction of content . According to Goodman then the class whose members are the counties of Utah is not to be distinguished from the class of acres of Utah or from the single individual the state of Utah. This view has been described as a simple materialism based on the crude principle that the entities supposed unintelligible classes as distinct from their members are those things we cannot point at or hold in our hands. In Fact Fiction and Forecast Goodman proposed his new riddle of induction . Hume had seen that we make predictions based on regularities in experience while arguing that there was no rational basis for this. But not all observed regularities form the basis for predictions though all examined emeralds are grue we do not imagine that all emeralds are. Goodman was an art collector and this interest was also reflected in his philosophical writings. In Languages of Art 1968 he discusses such topics as representation expression and authenticity from the perspective of what he calls a general theory of symbols . . aesthetics history of aesthetics problems of. N. Goodman Fact Fiction and Forecast 4th edn. Cambridge Mass. 1983 . ----Ways of Worldmaking Indianapolis 1978 . R. Rudner and I. Scheffler eds. Logic and Art Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman Indianapolis 1972 . good will. Moral agents on a Kantian view can be held accountable for the orientation of their will as they can not for their physical and psychological make-up. The will has to be seen as free initiating action because duty calls for it or else assenting also freely to action out of inclination. Thus distinctive or genuine moral worth lies not .
