The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 46

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 46. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 430 Indian philosophy Udayana eleventh century wrote Flower-Offerings of Arguments detailing five ways of proving the existence of a God. Atheist objectors offered excellent refutations of his cosmological arguments like this rejoinder If the universe requires a maker because it undergoes change even God needs a maker because he sometimes creates sometimes destroys. Almost all classical schools had a fully developed account of change and causality. Four major stands here were 1. The flux theory of the Buddhists the cause perishes before the effect arises. 2. The emergence theory of Vais esika the effect is a new entity emerging as inhering in the material cause even if the cause survives as the stuff. 3. The transformation theory of Samkhya the effect slumbers in the material cause with which it is substantially identical. 4. The illusionism ofmonistic Vedanta the cause alone is real the effect is an illusory projection of variety which cannot be unreal or real change is illusory like magic maya . There was fierce discussion over these rival accounts of causation. For example arguments for commonsensical emergence theory are E1 The perceptibly different lump of clay never does the same work as the pot made out of it. E2 If the pot was already there in the clay the potter s effort must have been in vain unless it is said to produce something non-pre-existent namely the pot s structure. If a structure can be added to reality why not the pot Against this the transformation theorists argue T1 What is unreal like a rabbit s horn cannot be made to exist. T2 If a and b are distinct it makes sense to ask Bring a along with b but Bring the coat along with the wool with which it was made is nonsense. So the coat and the wool must be the same in substance. To T1 the emergence theorist retorts You are confusing absence with non-being. The future sculpture is absent and not hidden somewhere in the hunk of marble but it is not a non-entity. A mere nothing does not qualify as a .

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