Nhưng, definitionally, đối tượng của một mong muốn cuối cùng thực chất là một cái gì đó là mong muốn chỉ vì những gì nó một cách rõ ràng đòi hỏi. Như chúng ta đã thấy, một kinh nghiệm mà là thú vị sẽ có tính chất nội tại khác (khi supervenes niềm vui mà). | The Desire Relativity of Value 145 to Fin many cases like that of feeling pleasure presupposes that you have been aware of yourself F-ing though it may be enough to have been aware of yourself exemplifying some similar property . to know what it is to run it may be enough that you have been aware of yourself walking . But definitionally the object of an ultimately intrinsic desire is something that is desired only because of what it explicitly entails. As we have seen an experience which is pleasurable will have other intrinsic properties upon which pleasure supervenes . If as is likely you do not have an ultimately intrinsic desire for the exemplification of these properties which together with pleasure make up G you do not have this sort of desire for the whole thing G but desire it for the reason that it has pleasure as one of its intrinsic properties. Since this desire is reason-based it is not intrinsic in my terminology. It is however probably what Audi means by intrinsic desires when he claims that such desires can be rational or well-grounded as well as ill-grounded 2001 87-8 . For there cannot be any ground or reason for the ultimately intrinsic desire for pleasure that pleasure is pleasure is no reason . There is some justification for Audi s usage when the relevant reason refers to intrinsic or non-relational properties of the object of desire. But such desires will not qualify as ultimately intrinsic in the sense here defined since they are reason-based they are derivative though the reason consists in the predication of a property internal to their object. It may be that in the course of time the apparent reason sinks into oblivion and thus that your desire for G is no longer reason-based. Then it has transformed into an acquired or derivatively intrinsic desire for G. This transformation from a reason-based or derivative desire to a derivatively intrinsic one does not demand an internal relation as the one between a part and a whole to come into .
