ashing vào đống đổ nát của một tòa nhà sau một trận động đất có vẻ như cả hai điều danh dự để làm và có lẽ cách tốt nhất để cứu sống. Tuy nhiên, mối đe dọa của cơn dư chấn làm cho một doanh nghiệp mạo hiểm. Dành thời gian để xem xét kỹ các thiệt hại cấu trúc gây ra bởi trận động đất không chỉ giúp bảo vệ các nhân viên cứu hộ, nhưng cũng có thể bảo vệ tốt hơn những người sống sót. . | PREFACE Dashing into the wreckage of a building following an earthquake may seem both the honorable thing to do and perhaps the best way to save lives. But the threat of aftershocks makes this a risky business. Taking time to consider carefully the structural damage caused by the earthquake not only helps protect the rescuers but also may better protect the survivors. Moving the wrong brick even a little however can bring the rest of the building down. In other words without proper analysis before mounting a rescue effort manmade aftershocks can cause more damage than the original earthquake. This book provides a public policy analysis of the Enron failure in an effort to avoid unnecessary manmade aftershocks. Specifically Enron s failure begs questions in at least four policy areas that should be analyzed before rushing into political action 1. Was Enron an innovator a sham or a bit of both What kinds of social institutions and corporate governance mechanisms can best distinguish legitimate but aggressive business and financial innovation from fraudulent deceptive and unethical business practices 2. Given that Enron was primarily an energy services firm that was both active and successful in energy and derivatives activities what can we learn from Enron s failure that might impact the future operation and regulation of energy and derivatives markets 3. Is structured finance and the use of special purpose entities a legitimate form of financial and risk management What role did accounting and disclosure policies play in Enron s apparent abuses of otherwise-legitimate structured finance activities What changes might be adopted to mitigate the potential for similar abuses in the future 4. Did the widespread proliferation of financial contracts and techniques designed to help firms manage their credit exposure to ailing counterparties exacerbate or mitigate the impact of Enron s xvii xviii PREFACE failure What lessons can be learned from Enron about credit risk .
