Biên dịch mã hóa , được liệt kê trong Chương trình 7,11, và sau đó chương trình PIC 16F84 với các tập tin được liệt kê trong Chương trình 7,12. Đặt PIC trong ổ cắm 18-pin và sau đó chuyển về quyền lực. Khi bạn xoay bánh xe và bộ mã hóa ổ đĩa bằng tay, PIC sẽ sản xuất một âm thanh mỗi khi một lỗ | Introduction to Multi-Agent Systems Yoav Shoham Written with Trond Grenager April 30 2002 152 Chapter 7 Mechanism Design Overview In the preceding chapters we presented essential elements of game theory. Throughout the discussion the issue was framed as follows. Given an interaction among a set of agents first we need to decide how to represent this interaction and second given this representation we need to predict or prescribe the outcome of this interaction. The representations included the normal and extensive forms as well as several others and the analysis consisted of investigating the Nash equilibrium and various refinements of it. Essential however was the we started with a given strategic interaction. We now turn to what is sometimes called inverse game theory. Rather than investigate a given strategic interaction we start with certain desired behaviors on the part of agents and ask what strategic interaction among these agents might give rise to these behaviors. Roughly speaking from the technical point of view this will translate to the following We will assume unknown individual utility functions and ask whether we can design a game such that in the equilibrium of that game the agents exhibit a certain desired behavior no matter what their secret utility functions actually are. This area called mechanism design or implementation theory is perhaps the most computer scientific part of game theory since it concerns itself with designing effective protocols for distributed systems. The key difference from the traditional work in distributed systems is that in the current setting the distributed elements are not necessarily cooperative and must be motivated to play their part. For this reason one can think of mechanism design as an exercise in incentive engineering. Mechanism design has many applications. The most famous of these is the design of auctions such as the popular online consumer auctions or the more somber government auctions of .
