assessing financial vulnerability an early warning system for emerging markets phần 2

thay đổi trong tâm lý thị trường có liên quan với "tin tức" của giá trị tài sản thấp hơn so với dự kiến những người mắc nợ châu Á. Một lý do khác giá cả thị trường không có tín hiệu cuộc khủng hoảng sắp xảy ra là tham gia thị trường khu vực được chính thức quốc gia hoặc quốc tế để bảo lãnh gặp khó khăn borrower. | change in market sentiment that was associated with the news of the lower-than-expected net worth of Asian debtors. The other reason market prices may not signal impending crises is that market participants strongly expect the official sector be it national or international to bail out a troubled In such cases interest rate spreads will reflect the creditworthiness of the guarantor not that of the borrower. Again it is not difficult to find recent examples where such expectations could well have impaired market signals. In Asian emerging economies several authors have argued that implicit and explicit guarantees of financial institutions liabilities were important in motivating the large net private capital inflows into the region in the 1990s. Others have emphasized that the disciplined fiscal positions of these countries may have convinced investors that should banks and finance companies experience strains governments would have the resources to honor their In the case of the Mexican peso crisis it has similarly been argued that after the United States had agreed to the North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA it would have been very costly for it to stand by while Mexico either devalued the peso or defaulted on its external obligations and that expectations of a US bailout blunted the operation of early warning signals Leiderman and Thorne 1996 Calvo and Goldstein 1996 . Looking eastward investments in Russian and Ukrainian government securities have in recent years sometimes been known on Wall Street as the moral hazard play reflecting the expectation that geopolitical factors and security concerns would lead to a bailout of troubled borrowers. Suffice it to say that the size and frequency of IMF-led international financial rescue packages including commitments of nearly 50 billion for Mexico in 1994-95 over 120 billion for Thailand Indonesia and South Korea in 1997-98 over 25 billion for Russia and Ukraine in 1998 and another 42 .

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