nợ các nước đang phát triển chủ yếu là bằng USD hoặc các ngoại tệ khác. Do đó một giảm giá lớn sẽ có tác động đáng kinh ngạc cho các gánh nặng trả nợ. Hơn nữa, cuộc suy thoái sau cuộc khủng hoảng tiền tệ xuất hiện nặng hơn | 12 Chapter 2. The Axiomatic Approach the set S when applied to the same set A. Since V represents the same preferences as uj the physical outcome predicted by the bargaining solution should be the same for S d as for S d Y Thus the utility outcomes should be related in the same way that the utility functions are fj S d Ojfj S d pi for i 1 2. In brief the axiom requires that the utility outcome of bargaining co-vary with the representation of preferences so that any physical outcome that corresponds to the solution of the problem S d also corresponds to the solution of S d Y Nash abstracts from any differences in bargaining ability between the players. If there is any asymmetry between the players then it must be captured in . If on the other hand the players are interchangeable then the bargaining solution must assign the same utility to each player. Formally the bargaining problem S d is symmetric if di d2 and si s2 6 S if and only if s2 S1 e S. SYM Symmetry If the bargaining problem S d is symmetric then fi S d f2 S d . The next axiom is more problematic. IIA Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives If S d and T d are bargaining problems with S c T and f T d 6 S then f S d f T d . In other words suppose that when all the alternatives in T are available the players agree on an outcome s in the smaller set S. Then we require that the players agree on the same outcome s when only the alternatives in S are available. The idea is that in agreeing on s when they could have chosen any point in T the players have discarded as irrelevant all the outcomes in T other than s. Consequently when they are restricted to the smaller set S they should also agree on s the solution should not depend on irrelevant alternatives. Note that the axiom is satisfied in particular by any solution that is defined to be a member of S that maximizes the value of some function. The axiom relates to the unmodeled bargaining process. If the negotiators gradually eliminate outcomes as .
