người được bổ nhiệm làm ủy viên hội đồng nhà nước của ngành nông nghiệp, giải thích tham nhũng với tôi theo cách này: "Ngay cả nếu tôi muốn tránh việc thực hành trao các hợp đồng trên cơ sở của thiên, tôi có thể không. Người của tôi sẽ nói rằng tôi ích kỷ và ngu ngốc. | Getting Anti-Corruption Incentives Right 399 governments cannot commit to protecting firms and their property rights. Such governments suffer as a consequence from limited foreign direct investments. Further governments will not hire tax inspectors if they give in to temptations for extra income. These effects maybe much more than moral considerations are responsible for the anti-corruption grassroots initiatives. Various business networks have been established with the goal of peer- monitoring members helping each other commit to anti-corruption actions. Even for intermediaries who are sometimes the facilitators of corrupt deals a network has been established that aims at signaling honest dealings by its In a similar spirit Transparency International has implemented the idea of Integrity Pacts where the procuring governmental department and all bidders agree on a monitoring system and tailor-made penalties to avoid bribery in public procurement. Such strategies must be encouraged to broaden the base for anti-corruption at the grassroots level as bottom-up methods can embrace even those who are tempted to pay and accept bribes. Conflicts between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Conflicts between top-down and bottom-up are standard in managerial science. These conflicts have also been well recognized in business But this topic has been only slightly explored for anti-corruption. Evidence from experimental investigations for labor markets reveals that a good deal of employee behavior is based on intrinsic motivation fairness and Employers may thus offer wage premiums so as to provide incentives for good performance even if this performance cannot be observed. In addition employers may disregard applicants who are willing to work for low wages. Most interesting employers may blindly trust that their employees are performing well. This type of trust often causes increased efforts among employees. To the contrary increased monitoring often .
