Sau đó, tất nhiên, không có tự hỏi rằng nó không đứng trong cách bản năng của sự lệ thuộc. Sự lệ thuộc này là tương tự như "sự tuân phục vô điều kiện."không Menger cũng không Böhm-Bawerk cho phép mình bị lừa dối trong bất kỳ cách nào trong sự phát triển của lý thuyết | Development of the Subjective Theory of Value 159 prices as they are not as they should be. If one wishes to do justice to this task then in no way may one distinguish between economic and noneconomic grounds of price determination or limit oneself to constructing a theory that would apply only to a world that does not exist. In Bohm-Bawerk s famous example of the planter s five sacks of grain there is no question of a rank order of objective correctness but of a rank order of subjective desires. The boundary that separates the economic from the noneconomic is not to be sought within the compass of rational action. It coincides with the line that separates action from nonaction. Action takes place only where decisions are to be made where the necessity exists of choosing between possible goals because all goals either cannot be achieved at all or not at the same time. Men act because they are affected by the flux of time. They are therefore not indifferent to the passage of time. They act because they are not fully satisfied and satiated and because by acting they are able to enhance the degree of their satisfaction. Where these conditions are not present as in the case of free goods for example action does not take place. 3. Eudaemonism and the Theory of Value The most troublesome misunderstandings with which the history of philosophical thought has been plagued concern the terms pleasure and pain. These misconceptions have been carried over into the literature of sociology and economics and have caused harm there too. Before the introduction of this pair of concepts ethics was a doctrine of what ought to be. It sought to establish the goals that man should adopt. The realization that man seeks satisfaction by acts both of commission and of omission opened the only path that can lead to a science of human action. If Epicurus sees in atapa ta the final goal of action we can behold in it if we wish the state of complete satisfaction and freedom from desire at which