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The Rise and Fall of Abacus Banking in Japan and China phần 4

Nhưng ngay cả khi ông đến tại chi nhánh khác, những điều không tốt. Ông đã nhận được lời chúc mừng một số, một hộp mô, và các dịch vụ miễn phí giám sát áp lực máu, nhưng không phải là "cốt lõi" dịch vụ ngân hàng ông dự kiến . Trong thực tế, nó được dễ dàng hơn cho bàn quản lý ngoại hối tại ngân hàng để đề nghị một "cạnh tranh" ngân hàng chứ không phải trải qua các thủ tục chuyển giao dây | The Rise of Abacus Banking in Japan 41 securing cooperation in keeping economic objectives going smoothly. 54 According to Abegglen this means that the government of Japan stands behind the debt position of major Japanese companies thus both making possible the financing necessary for rapid growth and ensuring that the government through the power of persuasion will play a central role in determining the nature and the direction of that growth.55 Standing behind the debt of large corporations the Japanese government in essence eliminated both traditional and non-traditional banking risks for Japanese banks. But government bureaucrats provided another perhaps even more effective way of eliminating risks for Japanese banks tight financial and banking regulation which as stated earlier controlled the behavior of bank managers and made risk management irrelevant altogether. Specifically financial regulation eliminated risks for banks by limiting competition both across banking and securities industries and within the banking industry. MOF regulation insulates Japanese banks from outside competition while preventing excessive competition among them. The MOF extended an unqualified guarantee against failure promising implicitly to use its full armada of powers to keep banks afloat. 56 Exchange rate controls and restrictions on foreign capital flows limited the entry of foreign banks and securities companies into the Japanese financial markets eliminating the exchange rate risks. Restrictions on inward and outward capital flows prevented savers and borrowers from exploiting foreign capital markets ensuring that domestic credit restraint was not frustrated by capital inflows under the fixed exchange rate system. 57 The Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 the Japanese version of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 limited competition between traditional banking and securities except for the purchase of securities for their own account. But financial regulation reached beyond .