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The Rise and Fall of Abacus Banking in Japan and China phần 9

Bổ nhiệm bởi một hội đồng quản trị lựa chọn Đảng Cộng sản, mục tiêu chính của quản lý là tối đa hóa "phúc lợi" của người dân, đó là, phúc lợi của đảng Cộng sản, nhà nước quốc gia,, và các quan chức chính quyền địa phương, số lượng lớn các doanh nghiệp nhà nước, và cộng đồng xung quanh. Ngay cả những doanh nghiệp tư nhân mới nổi và liên doanh có lòng thương xót của chính quyền tỉnh và địa phương, khi họ phải được hưởng mối quan hệ tốt với họ nếu họ muốn được và. | The Fall of Abacus Banking in China 135 employed rural migrant workers are added China s official unemployment rate of 3 percent jumps to close to 10 percent.11 In fact China s unemployment rate increased from 3.3 percent in 1993 to 8 percent in 1998. As expected price destruction took its toll on one of the country s exports especially after the Asian crisis. In 1998 for instance China s exports fell to around 7 percent one-third of the previous year s growth. Compounding the problem of slower export growth the Asian crisis scared away foreign investors making it difficult for its allying SOEs to raise capital through initial public offerings. By 1997 direct foreign investment had fallen to half of its 1995 size while exports slowed down see Exhibits 6.4 and 6.5 . With both exports and foreign investment slowing down China s economic growth came down to earth. Indeed economic growth declined from its 14 percent peak in 1993 to around 8 percent in 1999 see Exhibit 6.6 . In short China s lack of an expanding international and domestic frontier and her inability to innovate have taken their toll on her economy most notably on her SOEs which have been faced with declining profliability. Indeed SOE profits declined from RMB80 billion in 1994 to RMB20 billion in 1998 see Exhibit 6.7 . With declining profits SOEs continued to rely on state banks both for short-term working capital and medium-term capital. Indeed in 1997 close to 90 percent of state bank capital was allocated to finance the capital needs of SOEs see Exhibit 6.8 . Reflecting the heavy SOE borrowing from banks the debt-to-equity ratio of some SOEs has exceeded 500. In practice such a heavy debt burden means that many of China s state-owned firms are insolvent some cannot even cover their operating costs with their income. 13 Worse such loans were made at below deposit rates turning the interest rate spread negative. Indeed from April 1990 to January 1995 the gap between the average deposit rates and lending