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Inside the economist s mind part 6

Hoa Kỳ cho rằng họ không như thế này xuất khẩu vốn, và họ sẽ đánh thuế, sau đó tôi sẽ không cho vay tại Hoa Kỳ ngay cả khi tôi có thể đủ khả năng nộp thuế. Đó là khó gần, không yêu nước "Vì vậy, đó là một chút như những người điều khiển tín dụng khác vào năm 1980. | 190 Perry Mehrling if the United States government thinks they don t like this capital export and they are going to tax it then I am not going to borrow in the United States even if I can afford to pay the tax. It s unsocial it s unpatriotic. So it was a little bit like those other credit controls in 1980. A tax doesn t really mimic the market. It had unanticipated expectations and market effects. In fact you know I had to learn that lesson twice. The interest equalization tax while it tried to mimic the market it really didn t. What we tried to do with the credit controls in the eighties was the same. We tried to mimic the market and we got a different kind of reaction. Mehrling I want to finish here by talking about the issue of the independence of the Fed. I know that you had fights about this when you were at the Fed and a lot of it was about maintaining independence from the government. I wonder if you would accept the idea that what this is really about is about having autonomy to take the long-term interest and the general interest instead of the particular interest of the moment or the particular interest of the group in power at the moment. Is this independence more than just keeping government from financing itself by printing money Volcker Oh I think it s more than that. The traditional root of this concern about independence is that the executive would use the money creation power to finance itself but I think it is a general feeling that the money creation process even if not directly financing government peculiarly lends itself to abuse for short-term political purposes and the consequences are longer term. I don t want to say you can t trust the political process because in some ways I trust the political process to delegate that authority to the Federal Reserve to the central bank. It does have something to do with taking the longer-term view sure and not being corrupted if that s the right word by very particular political pressures. It s a grand .