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Ten Years aFTer: Revisiting the AsiAn FinAnciAl cRisis phần 10

Lý do thứ ba và cuối cùng lý do tại sao cộng đồng quốc tế không nên hài lòng với sự đồng thuận chính sách mới sau cuộc khủng hoảng đó, ngay cả khi sự đồng thuận mới đã được vận hành ở cấp độ chính sách, nó không đi xa đủ. | Mark Weisbrot economy.14 But this large accumulation of reserves currently at U.S. 461 billion for South Korea Malaysia Thailand Indonesia and the Philippines does provide these countries with a form of insurance that if they had possessed ten years ago could have mitigated or prevented the crisis and would have kept them away from the IMF consortium. The IMF s reputation authority and legitimacy was also permanently damaged by its mishandling of the crisis. Prior to the crisis the Fund was not very well known in the United States and developing countries the crisis did not make it a household word but it raised the IMF s profile considerably and in a very negative way. In 1998 there was a proposed 50 percent or 90 billion increase in the Fund s capital with 18 billion coming from the United States. Legislation for the 18 billion contribution from the United States failed on three votes in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives passing only after the Senate approved it and attached it to a conference spending bill. As a condition of the funding the U.S. Congress appointed a commission of economists to evaluate the IMF World Bank and other international financial institutions. The comission s report was highly critical of the IMF.15 Perhaps even more damaging were the unprecedented public criticisms that the Fund received from prominent economists. Joseph Stiglitz who was then chief economist at the World Bank and was later to receive the Nobel Prize in economics told the Wall Street Journal These are crises in confidence. You don t want to push these countries into severe recession. One ought to focus. on things that caused the crisis not on things that make it more difficult to deal with. 16 Jeffrey Sachs then at the Harvard Institute of International Development was even more blunt calling the IMF the Typhoid Mary of emerging markets spreading recessions in country after country. 17 The Cases of Argentina and Russia The IMF s credibility was further .