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Journal of Korean Law Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2009

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This Article offers an assessment of the preliminary evidence that the market for corporate control functions as a disciplinary mechanism for poor corporate governance in Korea. It analyzes SK Corporation’s fight against Sovereign Asset Management, contest for control over the Hyundai Group, KT&G’s fight against Carl Icahn, and LG Group and Carlyle’s proxy contest against Hanaro Telecom, together with relevant laws and regulations. These high-profile cases dramatically exemplified the role of takeovers in the improvement of the corporate governance of Korean companies, and brought about active policy discussions in respect of the market for corporate control and takeover defenses. This Article will also provide a quick overview.

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