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RATIONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE Part 4

Những nghi ngờ về các đối số Sách Hà Lan cho tiên đề liên quan đến niềm tin, mà Hájek thu hút sự chú ý của chúng tôi trong Chương 7, có một loại khác nhau, có vẻ như với tôi. | 170 PAUL ANAND context-dependent choice but they are also linked to McClennen s analytical work on the rationality of independence violations see Chapter 5 above as well as research into state-dependent utility which is just a special case of context dependence. Expected utility is not just a first-order approximation we might conclude but rather a useful exact model of context-free choice though one that does not possess the conceptual or axiomatic resources to reflect explicitly a range of considerations that normative decision theory needs to model. Elsewhere I have suggested that the only internal consistent preference axiom in formal rational choice theory that really was hands off would be a form of dominance which constrains behavior to match preferences. The doubts about the Dutch Book arguments for axioms concerning belief to which Hájek draws our attention in Chapter 7 are of a different kind it seems to me. I find it a little surprising that there are as many potential difficulties with Dutch Book arguments for probability axioms and agree with Hájek that these do not seem to undermine the classical axioms of probability. However I also accept that there are concepts of credence like potential surprise weight of evidence and ambiguity which might be given more prominence when thinking about how rational agents cope with uncertainty. No doubt the axioms of subjective expected utility theory will continue to be recognized as central in the history of economic theory but their equation with rationality seems less compelling than perhaps it once did and the arguments concerning are transitivity are illustrative. REFERENCES Anand P. 1987 . Are the Preference Axioms Really Rational Theory and Decision 23 189214. ----- 1990 . Interpreting Axiomatic Decision Theory. Annals of Operations Research 23 91-101. ----- 1993a . The Foundations of Rational Choice under Risk. Oxford Oxford University Press. ----- 1993b . The Philosophy of Intransitive Preference. Economic